The instant case is governed in material respects by Bander v. Here, the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving special damages, an essential element of his case.Ĭonceding that he has failed to allege any facts tending to show special damages, the plaintiff claims that Sampson's slander was actionable per se without proof of special damages because it fell within the narrow exception for slander which "prejudice him in his office, profession or business or may probably tend to do so." Lynch v. Generally, spoken words are not actionable per se without proof of special damages, which consist of economic, as distinguished from general, damages. Summary judgments are favored in defamation cases. Additional facts pertaining to this incident will be discussed as the need arises. I'm going to get you for that." After reviewing surveillance tapes which revealed that a former employee was responsible for the incident, Sampson apologized to the plaintiff.
What do you think you're doing? You're going to jail. That incident involved a disgruntled former IDC employee posting bumper stickers all over the employee parking garage that stated "Chris Sampson is a fat loser." After seeing the stickers, Sampson confronted Alba in his office, hysterical, with tears in her eyes, screamed "You fucking asshole. The plaintiff has waived all defamation claims against Sampson with the exception of his claim arising from the so-called "bumper sticker" incident. "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Lyon v.
In reviewing the allowance of a defendant's motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. When a defendant demonstrates that the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case, summary judgment properly may be granted. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Following his lay-off, Alba sued IDC and Christine Sampson, an employee of superior rank who was not in his chain of command, claiming that Sampson defamed him and maliciously induced IDC to terminate hisĮmployment. In January, 1992, IDC laid off Alba as part of a company-wide reduction in force. For approximately five years, the Interactive Data Corporation (IDC) employed the plaintiff, Wayne Alba, as an accountant. Ilene Robinson Sunshine for the defendant.īROWN, J. Smith, Jr, J., on a motion for summary judgment. ĬIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 27, 1992. In a civil action, the plaintiff did not establish, in his claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, that the defendant acted with actual malice, that is, with a purpose unrelated to any legitimate corporate interest, in advising, when asked by the defendant's manager, that a new position be filled by someone other than the plaintiff. In a civil action, the plaintiff demonstrated no reasonable expectation of proving special damages, an essential element of his defamation claim based on the defendant's spoken words, nor did the plaintiff demonstrate that the alleged slander was actionable per se in the circumstances the judge correctly allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
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